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Abstract  
Theoretical virtues play an important role in the acceptance and belief of theories in science 
and philosophy. Philosophers have well-developed views on which virtues ought and ought 
not to influence one’s acceptance and belief. But what do scientists think? This paper 
presents the results of a quantitative study with scientists from the natural and social 
sciences and compared their views to those held by philosophers. Some of the main results 
are: (i) there is broad agreement across all three groups about how the virtues are to be 
ranked, (ii) all groups agree that unification is an epistemic virtue and there is even some 
evidence that simplicity is viewed as epistemic by scientists, (iii) all groups consider 
syntactic parsimony as more important than ontological parsimony, and (iv) all groups 
consider unifying power as independent from simplicity.  
  
1 Introduction  
The virtues of a good scientific theory, or simply theoretical virtues, are a central topic in the 
philosophy of science. Consistency, accuracy, simplicity, unifying power, and fertility figure 
prominently in debates about scientific realism and theory choice (Kuhn 1977, van Fraassen 
1980, McMullin 1982, 1995, Okasha 2011, Douglas 2014, Schindler 2018) and have also been 
discussed as “explanatory virtues” in the rich literature on the Inference to the Best 
Explanation (Harman 1965, Barnes 1995, Lipton 2004, Schupbach 2011). The literature on 
value judgments in science, too, includes discussions of the role of theoretical virtues 
(Longino 1996, Douglas 2009, Steel 2010). Finally, theoretical virtues have also played a role 
in the literature on laws of nature, and in particular Lewis’ best systems analysis (Lewis 
1973, Woodward 2014b).  
When philosophers ponder whether particular virtues are desirable, truth-
conducive, or whether there are any trade-offs between the virtues, philosophers have 
hitherto relied mostly on historical case studies, studies of bits of contemporary scientific 
Page 2 af 31 
 
practice, and formal work.1 However, alternative ways of grounding one’s philosophical 
theorizing have emerged recently in the form of experimental methods. 
 Experimental methods have been employed in several subfields of philosophy since 
the early 2000s (Knobe and Nichols 2017). Although there have been early attempts to use 
experimental methods in the philosophy of science (Stotz and Griffiths 2004, Stotz 2009), it 
has only been more recently that experimental methods have been embraced more widely 
(Schupbach 2011, Waskan et al. 2014, Douven and Schupbach 2015, Steel et al. 2017, Chall et 
al. 2019, Mättig and Stöltzner 2019, Robinson et al. 2019, Beebe and Dellsén 2020, Wilkenfeld 
and Lombrozo 2020, Mizrahi forthcoming). The current paper is a contribution to this recent 
wave in experimental philosophy of science. 
 The basic premise of the empirical study that was conducted for this paper is that 
scientists can be an important source of information about scientific practice in general and 
about theoretical virtues in particular: scientists are dealing with theories on a day-to-day 
basis, they have to make decisions as to whether to adopt a theory or not, and on what basis. 
They should therefore know best what considerations are most important for choosing those 
theories that will advance the goals of science best. Of course, scientists are not infallible as 
informants about their own practices and not all of scientists’ practices are good ones. Yet, if 
scientists are not terribly deceived about their own practices (the onus to prove the contrary 
would clearly be on philosophers, I think) and if scientific practice can be assumed to largely 
advance our knowledge (who would want to deny that?), then there is really no reason why 
philosophers shouldn’t want to use scientists as an important (further) source of information 
in their quest of understanding science. In fact, I think it would be a problem for 
philosophers if scientists do not think what philosophers think they ought to think.2  
 It goes without saying that philosophers often disagree about what one ought to 
think about certain questions. The study therefore didn’t make any strong assumptions 
about the questions it posed to its participants. Instead the nature of this study is exploratory, 
i.e., the study sought to explore the views of scientists on a number of philosophical 
questions concerning theoretical virtues in order to then compare those views to some of the 
dominant or influential views in the philosophical literature (and to the views expressed by 
philosophers in the same study).  
 The paper will proceeds as follows. Section 2 will provide motivations for the major 
hypotheses that the study tested. Section 3 will present the method of the study, Section 4 
the results, and Section 5 contains the discussion of the results and conclusions.  
2 Motivations and hypotheses 
In one of the first philosophical publications on the topic of theoretical virtues, Kuhn (1977) 
gave what is now considered a standard list of theoretical virtues: consistency (internal and 
 
1 Mizrahi (forthcoming) is a recent exception: Mizrahi used data mining techniques and corpus 
analysis to investigate the frequency of the use of terms related to theoretical virtues. 
2 The relation between facts and norms is an intricate one. I have more to say about it in my book 
(Schindler 2018). 
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external), empirical accuracy, scope (or unifying power), simplicity, and fertility. Since then 
the scholarship dedicated specifically to understanding the nature and role of theoretical 
virtues has been rather sparse, but there are a number of clarifications worth making about 
Kuhn’s original list.  
First, it makes good sense to distinguish internal and external consistency (see 
Douglas 2014, Schindler 2018). Internal consistency is the absence of any contradictions 
within a theory, whereas external consistency is the absence of contradictions with other 
(empirically established) theories. Second, Kuhn did not have much to say about what he 
meant by the fertility of a theory.3 There are different ways of interpreting fertility, but 
perhaps the most popular interpretation is that a theory is fertile when it has novel 
predictive success, i.e., when the theory successfully makes predictions about new 
phenomena (Schindler 2018).4 In what follows, fertility will be understood in this way. 
Third, there are two senses of scope or unification. According to one conception, a unifying 
theory is just more empirically accurate than one that doesn’t unify the relevant phenomena. 
However, this “deflationary” conception of unification, as one might call it, simply reduces 
to the virtue of accuracy. There is also another conception of unification, namely unification 
as identifying principles underlying seemingly disparate phenomena (Morrison 2000, 
Schindler 2018). For example, Maxwell’s theory identified light as a form of electromagnetic 
radiation, and in the 1970s high energy physicists unified electromagnetic and weak 
interactions in a precursor of the standard model, even when that didn’t yet translate to 
immediate empirical success (Schindler 2014). It is this ‘non-deflationary’ sense of 
unification which will be used in what follows.  
Although Kuhn thought that the list of virtues he came up with was fairly widely 
accepted as universal standard, he stated that “two men fully committed to the same list of 
criteria for choice may nevertheless reach different conclusions [as to what theory to 
choose]” (Kuhn 1977, 358); either because they interpret the virtues differently, or because 
they weigh them differently. Kuhn gave several examples where different virtue preferences 
would lead to different theory-choices for the same pairs of theories and he also emphasized 
“external” factors (such as ideology) that may shape scientists’ preferences for some virtues 
(e.g. Copernicus’s preference for simplicity Kuhn attributed to his Neoplatonism). All this 
led Kuhn to conclude that there is “no algorithm” for rational theory choice.5  
Kuhn is probably right that there is a lot of diversity of theory-choice preferences in 
the scientific community (and its subcommunities). However, if, despite this diversity, there 
was an aggregate preference order to be found in the scientific community, meaning that the 
majority of scientists would prefer some virtues over others, then theory choice could be 
 
3 Kuhn (1977) described fertility is a theory’s capacity to “disclose new phenomena or previously 
unnoted relationships among those already known” (322). 
4 For alternatives see McMullin (1976) and Ivani (2018). 
5 Okasha (2011), in a much discussed paper, argues that an algorithm for theory choice may be 
impossible and contrasts this with Kuhn’s view of “no unique” algorithm for theory choice.  
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determinate after all. The present study sought to test this question empirically in the form 
of the following hypothesis:6 
H1: Scientists have an aggregate preference order for theoretical virtues. [In what follows 
we will refer to this hypothesis as virtue_preferences]. 
One of Kuhn’s examples that illustrates that virtues can be interpreted rather differently 
from one scientist to another is the apparent simplicity of the Copernican system as 
compared to the apparent complexity of the Ptolemaic system. As Kuhn points out, there 
was a sense in which the two systems were actually equally simple: Copernicus also 
employed a number of epicycles to accommodate planetary motions accurately. Many other 
philosophers have made similar points to illustrate the vagueness of simplicity and 
concluded that simplicity is a very problematic theory-choice criterion (McAllister 1999, 
Douglas 2014, Achinstein 2018). Given these issues with simplicity, one may expect them to 
rank simplicity fairly lowly, when forced to rank the virtues. The current study therefore 
tested the following hypothesis: 
H2: scientists rank simplicity lower than other theoretical virtues. [simplicity_ranking]. 
 A central focus of many philosophical discussions of theoretical virtues is the 
question of whether virtues like simplicity and unifying power are epistemic virtues, that is, 
whether they are truth-conducive. Famously, this question has been emphatically denied by 
the antirealist van Fraassen (1980, 1989), who argued that simplicity and unifying power in 
particular are merely pragmatic virtues, that is, virtues that concern the use of theories, but 
not their truth content.7 This ‘pragmatist’ view of theoretical virtues, as one may call it, has 
been embraced by many others, even outside the realism debate – particularly with regards 
to simplicity (Hacking 1982, Barnes 1995, Douglas 2009, 2014, Achinstein 2018, Wray 2018). 
Where do scientists stand on this matter? The study tested the following hypothesis:  
H3: scientists view simplicity / unification as merely pragmatic virtues. 
[simpl/unific_pragmatic]. 
As already mentioned, simplicity is a notoriously vague virtue; it can come in many 
shapes and forms. Two broad forms of simplicity have however been identified, namely 
syntactic and ontological parsimony (Baker 2016). When a theory is syntactically 
parsimonious, it employs relatively few theoretical principles in explaining the phenomena. 
When a theory is ontologically parsimonious, it employs a relatively small number of basic 
entities in explaining the phenomena. There are many further questions and complications, 
such as ‘how few principles or entities must a theory employ in order to be simple?’ and 
‘what (sub)form of simplicity is relevant for a particular instance of theory choice?’. (Baker 
 
6 I formulated the hypotheses of this study in such a way that they appropriately contrast with the 
relevant null hypotheses, which predict a state of no difference. The particular form of the hypotheses 
should not be understood as an endorsement.    
7 Note also that van Fraassen’s skepticism about unification would not make much sense if unification 
were to reduce simply to accuracy.  
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2016, Achinstein 2018, Schindler 2018). The broad distinction between ontological and 
syntactic parsimony, however, is clear enough.   
 There is yet a further, more technical sense of simplicity that has been discussed in 
the philosophy of science literature. It concerns simplicity in terms of parameter freedom 
(Forster and Sober 1994, Sober 2015). A free parameter in a theory is a parameter whose 
value is not determined theoretically, but has to be ‘fixed’ on the basis of experiments. An 
well-known example is the standard model in particle physics, which doesn’t predict many 
of the masses of the particles that figure in it (Friederich et al. 2014). Limited parameter 
freedom is widely regarded as a virtue, since it is harder to accommodate the phenomena in 
an ad hoc fashion (Forster and Sober 1994, Hitchcock and Sober 2004, Worrall 2014, Sober 
2015, Schindler 2018). And the fewer the free parameters, the ‘simpler’ the theory or model.  
The study sought to find out whether scientists agreed that these features (i.e., 
syntactic and ontological parsimony, and paucity of free parameters) would make a theory 
simpler and whether they would prefer any one of these features by testing the following 
hypothesis:  
H4: scientists consider a theory with few free parameters / few basic principles / few basic 
entities simple. [simplicity_nature]. 
 Accounts of unification often appeal to simplicity. For example, Kitcher’s influential 
(and still dominating) account has it that a theory is unifying if it allows one to derive a large 
number of phenomena from a small number of argument patterns (Kitcher 1981, see 
Woodward 2014a). In other words, the fewer argument patterns a theory employs in 
accommodating the phenomena, the more unifying it is. In order to check whether there is 
this kind of reciprocal relationship between unification and simplicity, the following 
hypothesis was tested: 
H5: scientists subscribe to the view that the more unifying the theory, the simpler it is. 
[simpl_unific]. 
Finally, a more overarching hypothesis that this study tested was whether the views 
articulated by philosophers would actually reflect the views by practitioners working in the 
fields studied by philosophers. As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, it would be 
problematic for philosophers to articulate views about science that are unrecognizable or 
even in conflict with the views held by scientists about their own practices. To test whether 
or not this is the case, the study tested the following hypothesis:  
H6: there is disagreement between scientists and philosophers. [:sci_vs_phil]. 
 The study tested the aforementioned hypotheses by consulting the judgments of 
natural scientists, social scientists, and scholars from history and philosophy of science.  
3 Methods  
3.1 Participants 
Subjects were recruited from three larger academic fields: natural science, social science, and 
history and philosophy of science (HPS). The study was advertised via email lists (such as 
Philos-L, HOPOS, PSA), social media (Twitter and Facebook), and by contacting science 
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department heads and members via email.8 The online platform used to implement the 
study was Qualtrics. Participation was incentivized with an optional amazon.com voucher 
lottery. The return was as follows: 86 philosophers, 214 natural scientists, and 278 social 
scientists.9 The average age of these three groups were, 38.6, 47.8, and 49.2, respectively (see 
also Appendix 1). The percentage male in these groups was 80%, 74%, and 71%, 
respectively, reflecting the unfortunate gender imbalance in these fields. See Appendix 1 for 
a detailed overview of the disciplines of the participating scientists. Subjects spent 782 
seconds (ca. 13 min) on average on the questionnaire. 
3.2 Study design 
The questionnaire consisted of three main blocks of questions (“theories” (5), “simplicity 
and unification” (5), and “intuitions” (3)) and background questions before (2) and after (5) 
the three main blocks. The first two background questions related to the participants’ 
research field (B1) and research orientation (theoretical or empirical; B2). The thirteen 
substantive questions of the questionnaire related to the purpose of theories (Q1.1), the 
ranking of theoretical virtues (Q1.2), prediction and ad hocness (Q1.3-1.5), the epistemicity 
of virtues (Q2.2 and Q2.3), the nature of virtues (Q2.1, Q2.4), aesthetics and virtues (Q2.5) 
and intuitions in theoretical and empirical discovery (Q3.1-Q3.3). The answer options / 
statements of each question in this block were randomized. The background questions at the 
end of the questionnaire related to the gender, academic position, age, language skill, and 
residence of the participants (B3-B7). The current paper focusses on a discussion of a subset 
of the substantive questions, namely on Q1.2, Q2.1, Q2.4, Q2.2, and Q2.3, under the 
consideration of the information provided in the background questions. The results of the 
remaining questions will be published elsewhere. The full questionnaire that was presented 
to participants is accessible at https://osf.io/pdscx/. 
3.3 Materials 
The first background question of the study (B1) identified participants as natural scientists, 
social scientists, or as scholars working in the history and philosophy of science, and asked 
natural and social scientists to specify their academic discipline (natural scientists: Physics, 
Biology, Chemistry, Geology; social scientists: Political Science, Psychology, Sociology, 
Economics, Anthropology, Linguistics). The second background question of the study (B2) 
asked scientists about the orientation of their research (either theoretical or empirical): 
 How would you best describe your own work? 
• Most of my work is of a theoretical nature.  
• Most of my work is of an empirical nature. 
 
8 Prof. James Beebe kindly provided me with a list of emails with scientists from US-American 
departments which he had used for his study on realism in science (Beebe and Dellsén 2020). 
9 A further 226 subjects begun the questionnaire, but didn’t complete it. Those subjects were excluded 
from the analysis. Since the questionnaire was distributed through department heads who passed on 
the participation request to their colleagues, it is hard to estimate an accurate participation 
percentage. However, the return for people contacted through the email list kindly provided to me by 
Prof. Beebe was about 5%. See also previous footnote.  
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Philosophers received an analogous forced choice question about their research interests: 
What part of science that you study is of most interest to you? 
• The theoretical part of science. 
• The empirical part of science. 
Philosophers were also given the following instruction:  
• In what follows, please consider the scientific field that you know best (physics, biology, 
chemistry, etc.), and answer accordingly. 
The first substantive question of the study (Q1.1) asked subjects about their epistemic 
attitudes toward the best theories in their academic field:  
What do you think is the case of the best theories in your scientific field? 
• They do a good job of summarizing and organizing the facts.  
• They help us to get ‘behind’ the phenomena to the underlying causes or laws.    
• They set constraints that the phenomena must obey.   
Participants were asked to register their agreement with each of these statements on a 5-
point Likert scale (5=strongly agree; 1=strongly disagree). The first statement was associated 
with an instrumentalist view and the second statement with a realist view. Obviously, 
statement 1 and 2 are not exclusive: one can hold both that a theory organizes the facts and 
that it latches onto something real. Yet, a negative answer to the second statement would 
indicate that participants hold antirealist attitudes regardless of subjects’ answer to statement 
1. The third statement was motivated by more recent literature on “explanation by 
constraint” according to which theories explain by putting necessary constraints on the laws 
of nature (Lange 2017).  
In order to find out whether scientists have an aggregate preference order for 
theoretical virtues (H1:virtue_preference), subjects were asked to rank the five (plus one) 
Kuhnian virtues according to their perceived importance in Q1.2 of the study.  
Please rank the following statements in the order of importance to you (1 = most important, 2 = 2nd 
most important, etc.). You can change the position by dragging and dropping the statements.   
"A good scientific theory should ... " 
• … be accurate with regard to all the relevant data. 
• … be simple. 
• … be externally consistent: it shouldn’t contradict what other established theories say. 
• … be internally consistent: it shouldn't contain contradictions. 
• … accurately predict phenomena that weren’t known before the theory was devised. 
• … unify phenomena that prior to the theory appeared to be unconnected.10 
 
10 Note that this statement was articulated in such a way that it would avoid any appearance of a 
“deflationary” conception of unification (see Section 2). 
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In Q2.1, the study sought to clarify whether subjects agreed that a theory with certain 
features is simple (H4:simplicity_nature). Subjects had to indicate their agreement on a 5-
point Likert scale for each of the following three statements:  
What makes a theory simple for you? A theory is simple, if ... 
• ... it has a small number of free parameters.  
• ... it uses a small number of basic principles.   
• ... the number of basic things which it postulates (e.g. particles) is small.    
In two questions of the study (Q2.2 and Q2.3), it was explored whether subjects perceived 
unification and simplicity as epistemic or merely pragmatic (i.e., H3:simpl/unific_pragmatic). 
In the first question (Q2.2) it was determined whether subjects’ confidence in a theory’s 
correctness would be increased if a theory was simple or unified:   
Please indicate your (dis-)agreement with the following statements:  
"My confidence that a theory is correct is increased (everything else being equal), when ..." 
• ... a theory unifies phenomena previously thought to be unrelated.  
• ... a theory is simple. 
Subjects had to indicate their agreement on a 5-point Likert scale for each of the two 
statements. The rationale was that if subjects agreed with these statements, this would 
indicate that they viewed unification and simplicity as epistemic virtues, i.e., virtues that 
make the theory more likely to be true.  
In the second question regarding epistemicity (Q2.3) it was determined whether 
subjects would find it acceptable if a theory was conflicting with the data when it had other 
(philosophically controversial) theoretical virtues: 
Please indicate your (dis-)agreement with the following statements: 
"It's acceptable for a theory to be in conflict with some of the relevant data ..." 
• ... when a theory unifies phenomena previously thought to be unrelated.    
• ... when a theory is simple.    
• It's not acceptable for a theory to be in conflict with any of the relevant data.   
Subjects had to indicate their agreement on a 5-point Likert scale for each of the three 
statements. The rationale behind this second question (Q2.3) was that if subjects believed 
that unifying power or simplicity were epistemic virtues, they should be more willing to 
accept conflicts between theories with these virtues and the data, because then the virtues 
would give them reasons to believe in the theory despite the theory not accommodating all 
the data (van Fraassen 1980, Schindler 2018). On the other hand, if the virtues were merely 
pragmatic, they shouldn’t be so inclined. Question Q2.3 also contained an optional 
subquestion, where subjects were invited to state further reasons or circumstances under 
which conflicts with the data were acceptable: 
It’s acceptable for a theory to be in conflict with some of the relevant data, when ... (optional)  
Q2.4 was designed to probe the relationship between unification and simplicity:  
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• Do you agree with the following statement? The more unifying a theory, the simpler it is. 
Subjects had to indicate their agreement on a 5-point Likert scale.  
Before we move on to the next section, where I will present the results of the study, I 
want to address a more general objection to a study such as the present one.  
3.4 An objection to the study design 
There is a view of theory-choice according to which theory-choice is a highly contextual 
matter: there are no theory-properties that could be regarded as universally ‘virtuous’ or 
worth striving for in each and every context of theory choice. Instead, the way in which 
scientists rank virtues differs from one context to the other. On such a contextualist view, 
one may be concerned that it wouldn’t make much sense to ask scientists about their 
preferences in an unqualified way.11  
 I’m sympathetic to the contextualist view. However I do not think it follows from 
this view that one cannot ask scientists about their overall preferences: even if scientists’ 
preferences depended on the particular theory-choice situations, all that is required by the 
current study is that scientists have a preference for certain virtues in most contexts, or for 
certain virtues in the most important contexts, or perhaps even in only certain ideal 
circumstances (after all we are talking about desirable theory-properties). If even that wasn’t 
the case, and scientists’ preferences were so context-dependent that it would be impossible 
for them to express any general preferences, one would have expected – in a study like the 
current one – that scientists neither agree or disagree with the study prompts. But that is not 
borne out by the results, as we shall see in a moment.  
4 Results 
This section presenting the results of the study are structured as follows. Section 4.1 and 4.2 
present the results of questions B2 and Q1.1, respectively. The data from these questions 
provided background information that was used to further analyze some of the results of 
the main questions of the survey. Section 4.3 to 4.5 present the results pertaining to 
hypotheses H1 to H6 in the following order: hypotheses H1:virtue_preferences and 
H2:simplicity_ranking are discussed in Section 4.3, H3:simpl/unific_pragmatic in Section 4.4, 
H4:simplicity_nature and H5:simpl_unific in Section 4.5. H6:sci_vs_phil will be assessed in each 
section.  
4.1 Professional orientation  
The professional orientation of subjects (B2) was as follows (theoretical orientation vs. 
empirical orientation): Nat (36% vs. 66%), Soc (35% vs. 65%), and HPS (87% vs. 13%). It’s 
quite apparent that the participants from both the natural and the social sciences have 
predominantly empirical research interests (about two thirds each). Among philosophers, 
 
11 I thank an anonymous referee for raising this objection.  
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there was a surprising dominance of interest in the theoretical (rather than the empirical) 
part of science.  
4.2 Realist attitudes 
In Q1.1, subjects were asked about their realist attitudes towards the best theories in their 
field. On average, all three groups indicated agreement (at about an equal level) with 
statement 1 (organization of facts): HPS = 3.92 (SD=0.98); Nat = 4.23 (SD=0.9); Soc = 4.05 
(SD=0.91). There were similar levels of agreements with the “realist” statement 2: HPS = 3.91 
(SD=1.23), Nat = 4.46 (SD=0.84), Soc = 4.35 (SD=0.98). The percentage realist vs. antirealists 
were: Nat (91% vs. 6%), Soc (87% vs. 5%), HPS (76% vs. 7%).12  
This finding accords with what was found by Beebe and Dellsén (2020) for natural 
scientists.13 In contrast to the study by Beebe and Dellsén, the current study also found 
strong realist attitudes among social scientists and among philosophers. This may have 
something to do with the particular form of the question that the two studies posed.14  
With regard to statement 3, i.e., the setting of necessary constraints by theories, only 
the natural scientists agreed: Nat= 3.63 (SD=1.38), Soc = 3.09 (SD=1.4), HPS = 3.07 (SD=1.35).15 
These results were not used in this paper. 
4.3 Theoretical Virtues: preferences 
In Q1.2 subjects had to rank theoretical virtues according to their relative importance. On the 
basis of subjects’ responses, the Condorcet winner was determined. The findings are 
summarized in Table 1 with the ranks the virtues were assigned on the basis of the number 
of wins against the other virtues.  
 HPS Nat Soc 
 
12 These numbers are the sums of the moderate and the extreme ends (strongly agree/disagree) of the 
Likert scales. 
13 A study by Robinson et al. (2019) – amongst other things – surveyed scientists about their views 
regarding what is often referred to as ‘metaphysical realism’; the focus of the current study, however, 
was on ‘epistemic realism’. See also Beebe and Dellsén (2020) for the distinction and a brief discussion 
of Robinson et al.’s paper.  
14 Beebe and Dellsén asked subjects whether our best scientific theories are “at least approximately 
true”. Because there is widespread aversion among scientists to the notion of truth, the current study 
avoided any reference to it. 
15 T-tests were used to check whether the means were statistically different from the mid-point of the 
Likert scale: Nat t(213)=0.46, p=0.000), Soc t(279)=0.06, p=0.305, HPS t(85)=0.05, p=0.634). Throughout 
this paper, t-tests were used for checking divergences from the mid-point unless the results were 
noticeably above or below the midpoint (e.g. at least around 4 or at most around 2). 
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1st internally consistent (5) internally consistent (5) internally consistent (5) 
2nd  accurate (4) accurate (4) accurate (4) 
3rd predictive (3) predictive (3) predictive (2)* 
unifying (2)* 4th unifying (2) unifying (2) 
5th externally consistent (1) simple (1) simple (1) 
6th  simple (0) externally consistent (0) externally consistent (0) 
Table 1 Results of a Condorcet winner analysis regarding the ranking of theoretical virtues. The number of pair-
wise wins of a particular virtue against other virtues are in brackets. (*) indicates a tie.   
The results show that all three groups ranked internal consistency higher than any other 
virtue, followed by accuracy, and predictive success. Unifying power, was ranked 4th by 
philosophers and natural scientists, and joint 3rd by social scientists. Subjects in all three 
groups ranked simplicity low (HPS: lowest, Soc and Nat: second lowest). See also Appendix 
2 at https://osf.io/pdscx/ for the detailed win statistics and figures of ranking choices. 
 From these results we can conclude that there indeed exists an aggregate preference 
order for theoretical virtues among scientists (confirming H1:virtue_preferences). 
Furthermore, there is clearly also strong agreement between the scientists and the 
philosophers (disconfirming H6:sci_vs_phil). Given that scientists ranked simplicity low, 
H2:simplicity_ranking is confirmed as well.     
4.3.1 Realism and ranking 
The study investigated whether subjects with a “realist” attitude (as determined by Q1.1; see 
Section 4.2) would be more likely for one to rank simplicity or unification higher than other 
subjects — perhaps because realists were more likely to view those virtues as epistemic. 
Order logit models were employed to test whether a higher degree of agreement (on the 5 
point Likert scale) would correlate with simplicity and unification being ranked higher. That 
was true only for the social scientists and the virtue of simplicity (p=0.007; see the Appendix 
3 at https://osf.io/pdscx/). However the number of subjects not committing to a realist 
attitude were very low (see Section 4.3.1), affecting the power of the test. No robust 
conclusions could therefore be drawn from these result. 
4.3.2 Professional orientation and ranking 
In one background question (B2), subjects were asked about their professional orientation 
(theoretical or empirical, see Section 4.1). Having a theoretical orientation in one’s research, 
one may speculate, may make it more likely to rank unification or simplicity higher than 
having an empirical orientation: theoreticians may find these “non-empirical” virtues more 
important than subjects working with more empirical problems. Order logit models were 
therefore constructed to test whether theorists would assign simplicity and unification a 
higher rank of importance than the experimentalists. However, that was not the case.  
4.4 Epistemicity  
In two questions of the study (Q2.2 and Q2.3), it was explored whether subjects perceived 
the philosophically controversial theoretical virtues of unification and simplicity as 
epistemic or merely pragmatic (this concerns hypothesis H3:simpl/unific_pragmatic).  
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4.4.1 Epistemicity: confidence 
In the first question (Q2.2) it was determined whether subjects’ confidence in a theory’s 
correctness would be increased if a theory was simple or unified. The results of this question 
are depicted in Figure 1.  
 With regards to the first statement (unification), subjects’ confidence in a theory’s 
correctness is robustly increased for all three groups (HPS, Nat, Soc) when a theory unifies 
hitherto unrelated phenomena. The means on a 5-point Likert scale for the three groups are: 
HPS=4.15 (SD=0.86), Nat=4.34 (SD=0.77), Soc=4.09 (SD=0.9). A one-way ANOVA showed that 
there were significant differences between group means: F(2,577)=5.399, p=0.005. A post hoc 
Tukey test showed that the difference between the mean of the Nat group and the (lower) 
mean of the Soc group was significant (p=0.003). In other words, natural scientists were 
significantly more likely than the social scientists to agree that unifying power increases their 
confidence in a theory’s correctness. However the effect size was small (Cohen’s d = 0.3).16 There 
wasn’t any significant difference between philosophers and either science group. 
 
Figure 1 Subjects’ views regarding whether their 
confidence in a theory’s correctness was raised by 
the theory unifying the phenomena or by being 
simple. The y-axis represent Likert scale ratings 
and the x-axis the two statements (unifying, 
simple). Error bars are standard errors. The 
lowest point of the y-axis corresponds to the 





As to the second statement (simplicity) there was neither strong agreement nor 
disagreement for any of the three groups. The means for the three groups were: HPS=2.97 
(SD=1.05), Nat=3.36 (SD=1.09), Soc=3.29 (SD=1.03). T-tests showed that the means of the Nat 
and the Soc group, but not the HPS group, were statistically different from the mid-point of 
the scale (HPS: t(85)=0.03, p=0.75, Nat: t(213)=0.32, p=0.000, Soc: t(279)=0.29, p=0.000. Both the 
mean of the Nat and the Soc group were toward the higher end of the scale. A one-way 
ANOVA showed that there were significant differences between group means: 
F(2,577)=4.354, p=0.013. A post hoc Tukey test showed that the mean of the HPS group 
differed significantly from both (higher) means of the Nat and Soc group (p=0.011 and 
p=0.032, respectively). The effect sizes were moderate and small (Cohen’s d = 0.36 for HPS-
 
16 In what follows, I assume that a moderate effect size is between 0.36 and 0.65 (exclusive). Effect 
sizes in the X-Phil literature – the literature perhaps most comparable to the present study – tend to 
be small to moderate. See also (Machery 2017). 
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Nat and 0.32 for HPS-Soc). There was no significant difference between the natural and 
social scientists. Hence, both the natural and social scientists tend to agree that a theory being 
simple raises their confidence. Philosophers neither agreed nor disagreed with this view.  
In sum, there is evidence that subjects (from all groups) perceive unification as an 
epistemic virtue. There is some (but much weaker) evidence that natural and social scientists 
perceive simplicity as an epistemic virtue. Hence H3:simpl/unific_pragmatic can be strongly 
rejected with regard to unification and to some extent also with regard to simplicity. 
H6:sci_vs_phil can be disconfirmed with regards to the question of whether unification raises 
one’s confidence but should be viewed as confirmed with regards to the question of whether 
simplicity raises one’s confidence. 
 
Figure 2 There was a larger group of scientists 
who agreed that the simplicity of the theory 
would raise their confidence. Nat: 50% agree 
vs. 20% disagree, Soc: 48% vs. 22%. 







4.4.2 Epistemicity: conflict 
The second question (Q2.3) determined whether subjects believed that conflicts with the 
data are acceptable when the theory is simple or unifying. The results are depicted in Figure 
3.  
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Figure 3 Subjects’ views regarding the 
acceptability of conflict between theory and 
data, if the theory is unifying (left) or 
simple (middle), and their views regarding 
the unacceptability of conflicts between 
theory and data. The y-axis represent Likert 
scale ratings and the x-axis the three 
statements (unifying, simple, and 
unacceptable). The error bars are standard 




The means for the first statement are (unification): HPS=3.44 (SD=1.12), Nat=3.08 
(SD=1.24), Soc=3.4 (SD=1.11). T-tests determined that the means of the HPS and the social 
science group responses were statistically different from the midpoint of the scale (HPS: 
t(85)=3.65, p=0.000, Nat: t(213)=0.06, p=0.348, Soc: t(279)=0.36, p=0.000. One-way ANOVAs 
showed that there were statistically significant mean differences between the three groups: 
F(2,577)=5.442, p=0.005. Post hoc Tukey tests determined that the means of both the HPS and 
the Soc group are statistically different from the (lower) mean of the Nat group (p=0.0039 
and 0.008, respectively). The effect sizes were small (Cohen’s d = 0.27 for Soc-Nat and 0.31 
for HPS-Nat). Hence, philosophers and social scientists, but not natural scientists, tend to agree with 
the statement that conflicts with the data are acceptable when the theory is unifying. The difference 
between the means of the HPS and the Soc group was not significant. 
It is interesting to note that there was a quite sizable number of subjects in all three 
groups (including natural scientists) who agreed that conflicts between theory and data 
were acceptable when the theory is unifying (see Figure 4).  
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Figure 4 A substantive number of subjects 
agrees that it would be acceptable for a 
unifying theory to conflict with the data: 
HPS=63% agree, 26% disagree, Nat=50% 







The means for the second statement (simplicity) are: HPS=2.73 (SD=1.24), Nat=2.54 
(SD=1.28), Soc=3.21 (SD=1.2). T-tests determined that each of these means is statistically 
different from the midpoint of the scale (HPS: t(85)=0.22, p=0.049, Nat: t(213)=0.36, p=0.000, 
and Soc: t(279)=0,18, p=0.003). One-way ANOVAs showed that there were statistically 
significant mean differences between the three groups: F(2,577)=19.091, p=0.000. Post hoc 
Tukey tests determined that there was no statistically significant difference between the 
means of the HPS and the Nat group (p=0.431), but there was a difference between the 
means of those groups and the (higher) mean of the Soc group (p=0.000 for Soc-Nat and 
p=0.005 for Soc-HPS). The effect sizes were moderate (Cohen’s d = 0.39 for Soc-HPS and 
Cohen’s d = 0.55 for Soc-Nat). Hence, philosophers and natural scientists tend to disagree, and 
social scientists tend to agree, with the statement that conflicts with the data are acceptable when the 
theory is simple. The difference between the means of the HPS and the Nat group was not 
significant. 
The means for the third statement (conflict not acceptable) are: HPS=2.64 (SD=1.36), 
Nat=3.1 (SD=1.35), Soc=2.55 (SD=1.32). T-tests determined that the means of the HPS and the 
Soc group differed significantly from the midpoint of the scale (HPS: t(85)=0.26, p=0.016, 
Nat: t(213)=0.07, p=0.289, Soc: t(279)=0.34, p=0.000). One-way ANOVAs showed that there 
were statistically significant mean differences between the three groups: F(2,577)=10.476, 
p=0.000. Post hoc Tukey tests determined that the means of the HPS and the Soc group were 
statistically different from the (higher, midpoint) mean of the Nat group (p=0.021 and 
p=0.000, respectively). The effect sizes were small for HPS-Nat (Cohen’s d = 0.34) and 
moderate for Soc-Nat (Cohen’s d = 0.41). Hence, philosophers and social scientists, but not 
natural scientists, tend to disagree with the statement that any data conflict is unacceptable. The 
difference between the means of the HPS and the Soc group was not significant. 
It is interesting to note that the detailed response profile of regarding the third 
statement revealed that respondents fell into two larger groups: those who in general reject 
that conflicts between theory and the data are unacceptable (overall the majority) and those 
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who agree that any conflicts between theory and data are unacceptable. There was only a 
small minority who neither agreed nor disagreed.  
 
Figure 5 There are two camps with regard to the 
question of whether conflicts between theories 
and the data are unacceptable: those who 
disagree (HPS: 58%, Nat: 44%, Soc: 60%) and 
those who agree (HPS: 37%, Nat: 48%, Soc: 






In sum, the results for question Q2.2 indicate that unifying power tends to be 
perceived as epistemic virtue by social scientists and at least a large subgroup of natural 
scientists. H3:simpl/unific_pragmatic is therefore to be rejected with regards to unification. 
The results of Q2.2 are less clear for simplicity: natural scientists tend not to accept data 
conflicts when the theory is simple whereas social scientists tend to accept them. 
Philosophers, interestingly, tend to agree with social scientists that data conflicts are 
acceptable for theories that unify, and they tend to agree with natural scientists that data 
conflicts are not acceptable for theories that are simple.  
A substantial number of subjects from all three groups answered the optional question 
Q2.3b (other circumstances in which conflicts are acceptable?): HPS (29%), Nat (37%), Soc 
(33%). The responses were coded manually. The three most frequent response given were 
(in that order): D = the data may turn out to be unreliable or untrustworthy / there is reason 
to doubt data (30%), I = all theories are idealisations / can never explain all the data / reality 
is too complex (17%), and E = theory successfully explains important or most facts, and fails 
to accommodate only less important or fewer facts (12%). No other theoretical virtue was 
mentioned for which data conflicts may be acceptable. See Appendix 4 at 
https://osf.io/pdscx/ for all responses.  
4.4.3 Epistemicity and realism 
An order logit model was employed to test whether a higher degree of commitment to the 
realist statement in Q1.1 (on the 5 point Likert scale) would correlate with a higher degree of 
agreement with the statement of Q2.2 or Q2.3. The results are as follows (see Appendix 5 for 
details).  
 With regard to Q2.2 (confidence raising), Soc was the only group for which a higher 
degree of agreement with the realist statement would correlate with a higher degree of 
agreement with the statement that unifying power raises the confidence in a theory (p=0.000). 
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Nat was the only group for which a higher degree of agreement with the realist statement 
would correlate with a higher degree of agreement with the statement that simplicity raises 
one’s confidence in a theory (p=0.003).  
 With regard to Q2.3 (conflict with data), Soc was the only group for which a higher 
degree of agreement with the realist statement would correlate with a higher degree of 
agreement with the statement that data conflicts are acceptable when the theory is unifying 
(p=0.004). There were no other significant results, also with regard to the statements that 
data conflicts are acceptable when the theory is simple, and with regard to the statement 
that data conflicts are not at all acceptable. 
4.5 Nature of virtues 
There were two questions in the study asking subjects about the nature of virtues (relating to 
H4:simplicity_nature). In one of these questions the focus was on the nature of simplicity 
(Q2.1), and the other asked about the relationship between simplicity and unification (Q2.5).   
4.5.1 Simplicity 
The results of this question are depicted in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6 Subjects’ views regarding the 
nature of simplicity. The y-axis represent 
Likert scale ratings and the x-axis the three 
statements (few free parameters, few 
principles, few things). Error bars are 






The means of agreement for the first statement (simplicity as parameter freedom) 
were: HPS=3.45 (SD=0.03), Nat=3.99 (SD=0.91), and Soc=3.61 (SD=0.88). They are all 
significantly different from the midpoint of the scale: HPS: t(85)=0.49, p=0.000, Nat: 
t(213)=1.08, p=0.000, Soc: t(279)=0.7, p=0.000. A one-way ANOVA determined that the means 
of the three groups were different: F(2,577)=15.051, p=0.000. Post hoc Tuckey tests showed 
that the means of the Nat group differed significantly from the (lower) means of both the 
HPS and the Soc group (p=0.000, each). The effect sizes were moderate (Cohen’s d = 0.58 for 
Nat-HPS and Cohen’s d = 0.41 for Nat-Soc). There was no statistical difference between the 
means of the HPS and the Soc group (p=0.316).  
There was broad agreement with the second statement (simplicity as few basic 
principles) for each of the three groups. The means were: HPS=4.14 (SD=0.81), Nat=4.08 
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(SD=0.92), and Soc=4.18 (SD=0.77). A one-way ANOVA did not reveal any significant 
differences in the group means: F(2,577)=0.844, p=0.431.  
The means for the third statement (simplicity as paucity of postulated entities) were: 
HPS=3.41 (SD=1.3), Nat=3.4 (SD=1.16), and Soc=3.49 (SD=0.98). They are all statistically 
significant from the midpoint of the scale: HPS: t(85)=0.31, p=0.005, Nat: t(213)=0.35, p=0.000, 
Soc: t(279)=0.5, p=0.000. In other words, all groups tended to agree (at a low level) that 
theories are simple when they postulate few entities. A one-way ANOVA did not reveal any 
significant group mean differences: F(2,577)=0.443, p=0.642.  
In sum, scientists agreed that simplicity implies a small number of parameters, a 
small number of principles, and a small number of postulated entities (even though the level 
of agreement differed). H4:simplicity_nature is confirmed. It is noteworthy that the level of 
agreement among all three groups was higher for the second statement (syntactic 
parsimony) than it was for the third statement (ontological parsimony). 
The agreement between philosophers and scientists was broad: only with regard to 
parameter freedom did natural scientists differ significantly from philosophers. 
H6:sci_vs_phil is thus mostly disconfirmed.  
4.5.2 Simplicity and unification 
Regarding Q2.4, namely the question of whether subjects agreed that unification implies 
simplicity, the mean results were: HPS=2.78 (SD=1.12), Nat=2.95 (SD=1.04), and Soc=2.79 
(SD=0.92). Only the mean of the Nat group was not statistically different from the midpoint 
of the 5-point Likert scale: Nat: t(213)=0.05, p=0.471, Soc: t(279)=0.23, p=0.000, HPS: 
t(84)=1.19, p=0.000. That is, social scientists and philosophers tended to slightly disagree that the 
more unifying a theory, the simpler it is. Natural scientists neither agreed nor disagreed. 
H5:simpl_unific is thus disconfirmed. A one-way ANOVA detected no significant differences 
between the means of the three groups: F(2,577)=1.724, p=0.179. H6:sci_vs_phil is thereby 
disconfirmed.    
5 Discussion and conclusion 
This paper presented results of an exploratory study into natural and social scientists’ views 
regarding theorizing and theoretical virtues. It compared these views to views held by 
researchers working in the field of “history and philosophy of science”.  
The study asked scientists to sort the theoretical virtues in the order of their 
importance and produced a Condorcet winner analysis of the results. It was found among all 
three groups that internal consistency had the most wins against the other virtues, accuracy 
the second most wins, predictive success the third most wins, and unifying power the fourth 
most wins (for social scientists, unification had as many wins as predictive success). 
H1:virtue_preferences could therefore be confirmed. Simplicity, which is often considered the 
most problematic theoretical virtue, ranked low: among natural and social scientists it 
ranked fifth (out of six ranks) with only one win. H2:simplicity_ranking is therefore 
confirmed. External consistency, however, ranked even lower (sixth with no wins). Given 
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the low standing of simplicity in the philosophical literature, it was not surprising that 
simplicity had the fewest wins among philosophers (none).   
 What do these results for discussions of theory choice? There is a view – most 
prominently defended by Kuhn – that has it that theory choice is a very subjective matter 
and scientists tend to have diverse theory-choice preferences that make theory choice an 
indeterminate matter. However the results produced by this study show that this view may 
be too pessimistic: scientists seem to prefer theories that are consistent, accurate, produce 
predictive success, unify the phenomena, are simple, and externally consistent (in this 
order).17 Given this agreement, theory choice – contra Kuhn – does seem to be a determinate 
matter.   
In order to test whether the lower ranking of simplicity had anything to do with how 
its epistemic status was viewed by scientists, the study tested whether scientists’ realist 
commitment would positively affect their ranking. However it turned out that only social 
scientists with realist commitments ranked simplicity significantly higher than their 
colleagues. There were no differences in the ranking of simplicity or unification by “realists” 
among the natural scientists and philosophers. However given the low number of “non-
realists” and the resulting ceiling effect all of these results should be treated with caution. 
There were two questions in the study that specifically and more directly sought to 
shed light on the potential epistemicity of simplicity and unifying power: a question relating 
to whether these virtues would raise subjects’ confidence in a theory and a question relating 
to whether subjects would find it acceptable that theories with such virtues conflict with the 
data. The rationale for the latter question was that if these theoretical virtues are merely 
pragmatic, then data conflicts shouldn’t be acceptable, because then the virtues would give 
scientists no reason to believe that the theory might be true despite the apparent conflict 
with the data. On the other hand, if these theoretical virtues were not just pragmatic but 
epistemic, then data conflicts should be acceptable, because then the virtues would give 
scientists reason to believe that the relevant theories are correct, despite conflicting with data 
(see van Fraassen 1980, Schindler 2018).  
With regard to the first question, subjects from all three groups stated that their 
confidence in a theory’s correctness is raised when the theory is unifying (everything else 
being equal). Both the social and the natural scientists also agreed that simplicity raises their 
confidence in a theory (everything else being equal), albeit at a lower level of agreement. 
Philosophers did not share this view. This is a first point of significant disagreement 
between philosophers and scientists (confirming H6:sci_vs_phil).   
With regard to the second question, social scientists and philosophers tended to 
agree that data conflicts are acceptable when the theory is unifying. Among all groups (even 
the natural scientists) there was a sizable subgroup who even strongly agreed with this 
view. Natural scientists (and philosophers) tended to disagree (at a fairly low level) that data 
 
17 Again, in the case of social scientists, the unification of the phenomena was considered as important 
as the prediction of novel phenomena.  
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conflicts are acceptable when the theory is simple. Social scientists, in contrast, tended to 
agree with this view.  
Realist commitments among social scientists correlate with viewing unification as 
confidence raising and with accepting conflicts with the data. Realist commitments among 
natural scientists correlate only with the view that simplicity raises one’s confidence in a 
theory. There were no significant results for philosophers. However – again – given the low 
number of subjects with non-realist commitments and the resulting ceiling effect, these 
results must be taken with a grain of salt. 
Combining the results from the “confidence”, “conflict”, and the “realist” questions, 
there is robust evidence that scientists view unifying power as an epistemic virtue, 
disconfirming H3:simpl/unific_pragmatic. Philosophers agreed with this view (in contrast to 
H6). With regard to simplicity, the picture is not quite as clear. The responses to the 
confidence question seem to indicate that both social and natural scientists view simplicity 
as an epistemic virtue, but the conflict question revealed that only social scientists tend to 
accept conflicts between simple theories and the data. Natural scientists tended to disagree 
that such conflicts would be acceptable. Clearly, social scientists have a more robust view of 
simplicity as an epistemic virtue than natural scientists. One may therefore conclude that 
natural scientists view simplicity also as an epistemic virtue (since they think simplicity 
raises confidence), but that they don’t view it as strongly an epistemic virtue as unification 
(since they disagree that data conflicts with simple theories are acceptable). So overall, there 
is evidence for the disconfirmation of H3:simpl/unific_pragmatic also with regards to 
simplicity.  
Philosophers were clearly the group most skeptical about the epistemicity of 
simplicity: they didn’t agree nor disagree that simplicity would raise their confidence in a 
theory and they disagreed that conflicts with the data would be acceptable. Philosophers’ 
skepticism was thus at odds with the social scientists on both counts (confidence and 
conflict) and at odds with the natural scientists with regards to the confidence question. H6 
is thus mostly confirmed.  
Philosophers may want to draw the following lessons from these results. First, this 
study provides strong evidence that one of the most prominent positions in the realism 
debate is mistaken with regards to unifying power not being an epistemic virtue (van 
Fraassen 1980). The study even provides some evidence that scientists view simplicity as an 
epistemic virtue, which is at odds with large swaths of the literature (McAllister 1999, 
Douglas 2014, Achinstein 2018, Wray 2018). Arguments concerning for example discussions 
about the underdetermination of theories by evidence, which have presumed that 
theoretical virtues such as simplicity and unifying power are not epistemic, may have to be 
re-assessed (see Tulodziecki 2012). Second, philosophers have assumed that the status of a 
theoretical virtue as epistemic or pragmatic virtue holds across the board for all sciences. 
However this assumption may be wrong. As this study shows with regard to simplicity, 
social scientists do indeed have different views from natural scientists. There may even be 
Page 21 af 31 
 
further, more fine-grained differences on the level of scientific disciplines. Philosophers in 
the future may want to study the reasons for this difference. Third, philosophers have 
hitherto tended to view theoretical virtues as either epistemic or pragmatic. However the 
results suggest that a more differentiated view of the potential epistemicity of theoretical 
virtues might be called for. On such a view, theoretical virtues are not necessarily either 
epistemic or just pragmatic, but they may be epistemic to one degree or another. For example, 
simplicity may also be an epistemic virtue (at least in some sciences), but not as strong an 
epistemic virtue as unifying power.18  
 With regards to the nature of simplicity, the study found evidence that natural and 
social scientists agree that theories are simple if they (i) have few free parameters, (ii) 
postulate few basic principles (corresponding to syntactic parsimony), or (iii) postulate few 
basic entities (corresponding to ontological parsimony). H4:simplicity_nature is therefore 
confirmed (for all three forms of simplicity). Natural scientists most strongly agreed with (i), 
perhaps owing to the higher degree of formalization of their theories. It is also noteworthy 
that the agreement among natural and social scientists for (ii) was much more pronounced 
than for (iii). Since much of the philosophical literature has hitherto focused on ontological 
parsimony (Nolan 1997, Baker 2003, Jansson and Tallant 2017), it may be time for 
philosophers to pay more attention to syntactic parsimony. 
Interestingly, the philosophers of this study showed similar levels of agreement as 
the scientists both with regards to ontological and syntactic parsimony (disconfirming H6). 
All the more reason, perhaps, for philosophers to turn their attention to syntactic parsimony.  
The study also investigated the relationship between unification and simplicity. On 
some leading accounts of unification, the more unifying a theory, the simpler it is (in terms 
of basic principles, in particular). However the study found no support for this view among 
scientists. Natural scientists were neutral on this issue and social scientists slightly 
disagreed. Philosophers also slightly disagreed that unifying power and simplicity are 
related in this way (contra H6). Unifying power and simplicity may therefore be considered 
as independent virtues, as far as scientists are concerned. H5:simpl_unific is therefore 
disconfirmed. Philosophers therefore may have to think of new ways of explicating the 
unifying power of theories; ways, that is, which do not appeal to the simplicity of theories.  
In sum, the study has shown that some philosophical accounts of theory-choice are too 
pessimistic: there is an overall preference ranking for the standard theoretical virtues, 
rending theory-choice a much more determinate matter than previously assumed by some. 
Scientists view unifying power as genuinely epistemic virtue and they even view simplicity 
at least as a weakly epistemic virtue. Scientists prefer syntactic parsimony to ontological 
parsimony and unifying power and simplicity are independent virtues. Philosophers can 
 
18 Schindler (2018), on independent grounds, has recently argued that some theoretical virtues may be 
only weakly epistemic. 
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take comfort from several points of agreement with the scientists. The most significant 
degree of disagreement probably concerns the question of whether or not simplicity is an 
epistemic virtue. This article suggested ways of how to amend this disagreement (e.g. 
allowing for degrees of epistemicity).  
Overall, then this study has provided valuable evidence for scientists’ views on 
theoretical virtues in theory choice and on the question of the epistemicity of theoretical 
virtues. It should therefore provide a new starting point for philosophical discussions of 
these issues.  
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Disciplines of participating subjects (in descending order): 
• Social Science: economics (140), linguistics (41), political science (39), sociology (31), 
psychology (20), info not provided (1) 





PhD student Other 
Philosophers 17% 26% 34% 15% 
Natural 
Scientists 
48% 20% 18% 14% 
Social Scientists 52% 20% 13% 14% 









Philosophers 43% 55% 
Natural Scientists 46% 48% 
Social Scientists 55% 41% 
Overall 50% 46% 
Table 2. native language of subjects. 
Country of residence (in descending order): 
USA: 270, Denmark: 54, Sweden 43, Germany 21, Finland 18, Norway 17. Subjects from 
other countries (<10), in alphabetical order:  Albania, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, France, Greece, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Russia, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey. 
 




Detailed Condorcet winner statistics 
The following tables detail the results of the Condorcet winner analysis for the six 
theoretical virtues, for each group separately (Nat, Soc Sci, and HPS).  
 
Natural science, Condorcet winner: consistency   
 
loses to consistency by 
loses to higher 
ranked virtue by 
accuracy 92:122 - 
prediction 84:130 91:123 
unification 61:153 81:133 
Simplicity 92:189 55:159 
external consistency 14:200 99:115 
 
Social science, Condorcet winner: consistency  
 
loses to consistency by 
loses to higher 
ranked virtue by 
accuracy 90:190 - 
prediction 74:206 119:161 
unification 75:205 140:140 
simplicity 44:181 96:184 
external consistency 17:263 87:193 
 
HPS, Condorcet winner: consistency  
 
loses to consistency by 
loses to higher 
ranked virtue by 
accuracy 36:50 - 
prediction 37:49 33:53 
unification 33:53 40:46 
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external consistency 7:79 23:63 
simplicity 11:75 33:53 
 
 
Ranking  choices 
The following diagrams show the percentage of subjects in each group (Nat, Soc, HPS) 




Diagrams showing the ranking preferences of 
subjects in each of the three groups (Nat, Soc, HPS 
clockwise) regarding six theoretical virtues. The x-
axes represent the rank of the importance at which 
subjects rated a given theoretical virtue (1=highest, 
6=lowest). The y-axes record the percentage of 
subjects selecting a given theoretical virtue at a 
particular rank. Hence, overall the diagrams 
represent the percentages of subjects ranking a 
certain virtue 1st, 2nd, … , or last. Each rank 
contains 100% of subjects’ virtue preferences for 
that rank. The colour coding for six theoretical 
virtues is: red = accuracy, blue = simplicity, yellow = 
external consistency, green = internal consistency, 
pink = predictive success, orange = unifying power.  
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Appendix 3 
Realist commitments and the ranking of simplicity  










































-111.819 -320.786 -467.574 
Random Effects Parameter 
(Variance) 
Field  N/A N/A N/A 
Results of order logit models testing correlations between IV: “Realism” (i.e. responses to the first statement of 
Q1.1) and DV: rank of simplicity in Q1.2. * represents p<0.05. Standard error in brackets.  
 
Appendix 4 
Coding of open responses to Q2.3 (see Section 4.4.2) 
• C = there are (potential) confounders which, when taken into account, can explain 
the conflict with the data away 
• D = the data may turn out to be unreliable / untrustworthy / there is reason to doubt 
data 
• E = theory successfully accommodates important facts / most facts, and fails to 
accommodate only less important / fewer facts 
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• I = all theories are idealisations / can never explain all the data / reality is too complex 
• N = the theory is relatively new and still under development / and will have to be 
improved (in order to later accommodate the data) 
• P = the theory is probabilistic (and doesn’t need to accommodate all data) 
• R = data are actually not relevant for the theory  
• S = accommodating the additional data would “complicate” the theory to an 
unacceptable extend (this could mean that a theory could accommodate the data, but 
only in an unacceptable ad hoc fashion, so that the data conflict is the lesser evil) 
• T = the theory is still better than the alternative theories – despite the conflict  
• ? = responses were hard to make sense of  
 HPS Nat Soc Sum % of all 
responses 
C 4 4 8 16 6% 
D 1+4* 38+3* 20 66 31% 
E 4 11 10 25 12% 
I 6 11 18 35 17% 
N 3 11 5 19 9% 
P 0 0 2 2 1% 
R 3 3 4 10 5% 
S 0 1 2 3 1% 
T 0 4 14 18 9% 
? 3 8 10 21 10% 
sum 28 90 93 215 100% 
Subjects stating reasons for when they consider conflict between theory and data is acceptable. Some subjects 
mentioned more than one reason (the number of subjects providing responses relative to the overall groups sizes 
were: HPS=25/86, Nat=79/214, Soc=92/278). * = the plus-sign relates to entries that mentioned the faulty 
interpretation of data or the flawed method of generating the data. 
 
Appendix 5 
Realist commitment and confidence: unification  




Realism  0.171 0.106 0.496* 
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(0.174) (0.164) (0.123) 


























-97.245 -220.952 -325.932 
Random Effects Parameter 
(Variance) 
Field  N/A N/A N/A 
Order logit models testing correlations between IV: “Realism” (i.e. responses to the first statement of Q1.1) and 
DV: confidence raised when theory unifying (Q2.2) * represents p<0.05. Standard error in brackets.  
 
Realist commitment and confidence: simplicity 




























Cut point 4 3.970 4.005 2.065 
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(0.844) (0.742) (0.546) 
Log 
Likelihood 
-121.357 -305.641 -392.496 
Random Effects Parameter 
(Variance) 
Field  N/A N/A N/A 
Order logit models testing correlations between IV: “Realism” (i.e. responses to the first statement of Q1.1) and 
DV: confidence raised when theory simple (Q2.2) * represents p<0.05. Standard error in brackets. 
 
 
